Discussions on akrasia (lack of keep watch over, or weak spot of will) in Greek philosophy were particularily brilliant and excessive for the previous twenty years. general tales that awarded Socrates because the thinker who easily denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly opposed to Socrates, were challenged in lots of alternative ways. construction on these demanding situations, this collective presents new, and every so often antagonistic methods of analyzing famous in addition to extra ignored texts. Its thirteen contributions, written through specialists within the box, hide the entire heritage of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, via Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).
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Extra info for Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus
The craft of measurement is compatible with even exceedingly strong nonrational desires that make objects appear quite clearly to be good when they are not. This objection rests on a misunderstanding of what we mean by strong and weak nonrational desires. Let us reiterate that we agree with our opponents that in the Protagoras discussion Socrates assumes that it is the nature of pleasure and relief from pain to appear good. The question, then, is not when do pleasurable objects appear good—in our view they always appear good—but rather when do they compel belief that they are good.
The reasons we have given for rejecting the traditional account of Socratic motivation is heavily indebted to Daniel Devereux’s 1995 article, ‘Socrates’ Kantian Theory of Motivation,’ although, as we shall see, Devereux cannot not very well agree with our view that only individuals with strong nonrational desires succumb to the power of appearance. Devereux maintains that knowledge makes the dunamis tou phainomenou lose its power because knowledge is always stronger than the nonrational desire that causes something to appear good.
2 thomas c. brickhouse and nicholas d. smith whenever the metrêtikê technê is present in someone he will not be defeated by the dunamis tou phainomenou. What is not clear in the Protagoras discussion is just why some things have the power of appearance at all. ’ In this paper we shall try to clarify both issues and in so doing criticize two different ways of understanding Socrates’ moral psychology. We shall argue, contrary to what is usually said, that, for Socrates, ‘the power of appearance’ is tied to the psychological agency of the appetites and passions.
Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus